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In his paper, John Sillince analyzes a fragment of a discussion which took place in an
organizational context, in an endeavor to show two things: that linguistic coherence is the result
of two processes, binding and unfolding, and that there are similarities between these two
linguistic processes on the one hand and both organizational processes and cognitive complexity,
on the other.
Mr. Sillince’s paper touches on a wide range of subjects and invokes a multitude of
perspectives. I find it somewhat difficult to comment on the paper, because it is not always clear
to me what exactly the focus of the paper is, or the problem that it sets out to investigate. So I
will limit myself to some remarks on a number of topics which have attracted my interest.
First, I would like to express some disappointment with regard to the treatment of
argumentation in this paper. The subject receives very little attention, and the little it gets, raises
a number of questions.
In the beginning of the paper, the author tries to find a perspective from which coherence in
argumentation can be approached. First, he rejects the conversational paradigm. He does so for
the wrong reasons, I think. Since Jacobs and Jackson’s seminal work in the eighties of the past
century, we know that argumentation does not require “a selfish monologue style of talking”.
Conversational argument, in which the various participants all contribute in building an
argument, is an ordinary form of argument, and, in fact, prototypical for monologual argument,
which, after all, is recipient-designed just as much as conversational contributions are. It also is
not self-evident why in argumentation “topic stability cannot be assumed so easily”. Argument
always centers on a standpoint, and the “disagreement space” (Jackson’s term) associated with
that standpoint guarantees the topical coherence of the argument. If anything, in argumentation
topic is less problematic and shifty than in conversation. In fact, a little later, Mr. Sillince himself
asserts that argumentation likens narrative in its thematic stability.
After considering narrative as a second model for analyzing argumentation, as a third
perspective the author takes up adjacency pairs. At first it is not quite clear why adjacency-pair
relations are considered a third perspective, that is, separate from that of conversation, but that
soon becomes clear, because these relations are put on a par with all kinds of other two-part
relationships, such as problem-solution, cause-consequence. I think that this constitutes a rather
unfortunate collation. In the first place, adjacency pairs are defined by strict sequentiality (first
pair part precedes second pair part) and the fact that the different pair parts are produced by two
different speakers. Neither characteristic applies to the problem–solution relationship that plays
such a central role in the analysis. In the second place, adjacency pairs constitute coherence on
the illocutionary level, while relations like problem-solution and cause-consequence create
coherence on the propositional level. Finally, the likeness between these relations and
argumentation seems not so very clear to me. The characterization of argumentation as having in
common with them “the creation of a reasoning step from an initial datum to a conclusion” is in
various respects not very satisfactory: to begin with, datum and conclusion are categories from
very diverse perspectives, but, more importantly, argumentation, which is a speech act aimed at
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convincing an opponent of the acceptability of a standpoint, is something different from the
reasoning process which underlies it.
It is unfortunate that in the short segment of the analysis later in the paper which actually
does address argumentation, notably in terms of Toulmin’s model, again this mix-up of different
categories occurs: two of the terms, Warrant and Claim, are Toulmin’s, but surely Toulmin
would be unhappy with the third term, Premise. On top of this, the actual analysis itself seems
misdirected: Mr. Sillince gives a clause-by-clause analysis, in which each single clause is
supposed to contain the elements Claim, Warrant, and Premise (in a way which is not very clear
to me). However, the argumentatively far more important relationships BETWEEN the various
clauses are not analyzed in these terms.
On to a second topic: Mr. Sillince’s rejection of Grice’s model for describing coherence.
Apart from the fact that the model is not rendered correctly (the maxim of Quality is absent, in
its place a reformulation of the Relevance maxim is given), some common misconceptions are in
evidence. First of all, Grice’s maxims are not prescriptive rules; they merely specify expectations
that conversationalists employ. These expectations may be violated, and in some cases it is
exactly these violations that generate meaning. In fact, this is precisely what explains the use of
ambiguous and symbolic language, which Mr. Sillince adduces as counter-evidence. Secondly,
Grice’s maxims are NOT absolutes. In fact, what they are about is the use of language
RELATIVE to a purpose. That is why a rendering of the Quantity maxim as “Be succinct yet
complete” is misguided: the maxim says that information will be given to the amount that is
relevant for the purpose or direction of the conversation at that point. Also, the maxims are not
into effect universally: Grice expressly stipulates ‘Unless there is evidence to the contrary, the
Cooperation Principle is in effect.’ That takes care of most of the counter-examples that are
adduced. Last but not least, there is no conflict between cooperation and conflict, or, in Mr.
Sillince’s words, “contradictory pressures that require hypocritical language.” Even in a conflict,
one needs to be understood, and in order to be understood an appeal is made to the cooperative
principle. Moreover, lying can only be done fruitfully if the Quality maxim is in effect, in other
words, under the assumption that one is speaking the truth.
A third matter concerns the status of the material that is analyzed in the paper. It is not clear
how much of the actual talk is rendered. In the first turn, do the dots signal that material has been
left out? And what about the humming and hawing, the hesitations, the pauses, the ‘well’s and
‘hmm’s, the overlaps and gaps? In order to understand the coherence of the utterances, these
interactional signals, which are part of the preference organization of conversational discourse,
are as important as the actual words, particularly where the expression of agreement and
disagreement is concerned.
This brings me to a fourth point: I dearly miss a speech-act analysis of the utterances in the
example. Coherence does not reside on the propositional level alone. In fact, analysis on the
propositional level becomes relevant only after coherence on the speech-act level has been
established. And for an analysis that tries to capture the way in which participants in a
discussion argue their way through a conflict of opinion, a speech-act level analysis is essential.
Some of this work, I admit, is done in the section on perspective, but it is not done in a consistent
and systematic manner, and it is conflated with a multitude of other things, such as topic,
politeness and other kinds of interpersonal business.
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As a final point, I would like to question Mr. Sillince’s attempt to establish a relationship
between discourse coherence and organizational or cognitive complexity. What it comes down to
is that in organizations and in cognitive complexity, we find, just as in discourse, differentiation
as well as integration. I believe that this could be extended to just about any area of life.
Everything has similarities and differences with everything else. And thus the claim becomes
rather uninformative.
After raising these questions and criticisms, I do want to end this response by noting that an
important part of what is done in the paper, particularly, the analysis of topic unfolding and topic
shift, strikes me as very interesting. Mr. Sillince gives detailed analyses, paying close attention
to the way in which the exact phrasing signals development and change. And it is this kind of
careful scrutiny of the way in which a discussion is carried on, that can be of considerable
service to the study of argumentative discourse.

